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Abstract 
Payment by Results mechanisms in social domains have been gaining attention in the last 
decade. The implementation of these models has led to the creation of specific instruments, 
more and more tailored to different situations. This is how Impact Bonds appeared in 2010, 
being later on sub-categorized into Social Impact Bonds and Development Impact Bonds, with 
the main specificity of its application being for developed countries and developing countries, 
respectively. However, there is an unequal growth in the use of these mechanisms: While SIBs 
have become very popular and widely adopted, DIBs only saw two cases of actual 
implementation, despite strong interest. 
 
This thesis will focus on Development Impact Bonds, aiming to understand how its structural 
differences from SIBs might be influencing its adoption. As a second step, after such issues 
are assessed, there will be suggested design choices, originating a new DIB model. As a third 
and final step, the new DIB model will be applied to the case of Girl Move, an NGO that 
operates in Africa and aims to fight low school attainment of girls.  
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Abstracto 
Pagamentos por resultados têm vindo a ganhar atenção em domínios sociais na ultima década. 
A implementação destes modelos tem vindo a proporcionar a criação de instrumentos 
específicos, cada vez mais adaptados a diferentes situações. Foi desta forma que em 2010 
surgiram os Impact Bonds, sendo mais tarde categorizados em Social Impact Bonds e 
Development Impact Bonds, distinguindo-se pela sua aplicabilidade a países desenvolvidos e 
a países em desenvolvimento, respetivamente. Contudo, tem-se vindo a observar um 
crescimento desigual na aplicação destes instrumentos: Enquanto os SIBs tornaram-se 
populares e amplamente adotados, no caso dos DIBs  apenas dois foram implementados, 
apesar de um grande interesse. 
 
Esta tese vai focar-se nos Development Impact Bonds, com o objetivo de averiguar como as 
suas diferenças estruturais comparadas à de um SIB podem estar a influenciar a sua adoção. 
Como segundo passo, após tais problemáticas serem analisadas, serão feitas sugestões a nível 
de design, originado um novo modelo para DIBs. 
Como terceiro e ultimo passo, o novo modelo de DIB vai ser aplicado ao caso da Girl Move, 
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I. Introduction 
On the 2nd of March of 2005 in Paris, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was issued, 
with the fundamental goal of making aid effectiveness a high priority.  
Every year, governments dedicate tremendous amounts of money trying to tackle current 
problems within their societies. Improving maternal and child health, increasing educational 
attainment and employment, or strengthening family stability, are just some of the main issues 
that governments so arduously try to overcome. Nevertheless, often the resources are allocated 
to interventions that yield discouraging results, instead of aiming towards innovative and 
improving approaches (Development Assistance Committee).  
 
Payment by Results (PbR) is a relatively new funding mechanism that intends to overcome 
such misallocation of funds. It aims to break the traditional concept of Governments 
establishing contracts or providing grants to a certain service provider (ex: NGO) in exchange 
for inputs, rather aiming for outcomes. Another specific feature of PbR is the post-payment 
feature; governments will disburse capital if pre-established outcomes were actually achieved 
by the service provider. (Pearson, Johnson, & Ellison, 2010) 
There are clear benefits of PbR mechanisms to governments. Since payments are made only 
if the pre-established outcomes were achieved, PbR can be especially attractive to 
governments as a way to realize greater accountability and efficiency by allocating resources 
to programs with demonstrable outcomes. However, this implies that the service provider will 
have to pre-finance the activities in the first place, requiring enough working capital for the 
intervention. This is an issue, considering that most service providers may not have a strong 
financial position to run interventions without receiving any revenues for a period of time, 
plus the risk of not being repaid in case they do not meet the pre-agreed outcomes.  
This led to the creation of a derivate of PbR, Impact Bonds. In a nutshell, Impact Bonds solve 
this issue by adding a third stakeholder, investors, who will provide upfront capital to social 
providers so they can run their activities to deliver the pre-defined outcomes. If these are met, 
governments will still make the disbursement of capital but to investors instead of social 
providers.  
This model of Impact Bonds has been proven to be quite successful in developed countries. 
So far 87 SIBs were launched since 2010 (Social Finance, 2017).  
However, when this same model is applied to developing countries, there is one issue that 
automatically arises: the lack of credibility and capability of these governments to re-pay 
investors for the outcomes they pre-financed. In 2015 the first impact bond directed to 
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developing countries was launched, switching the governmental entity for a foundation that 
would now assume the role of payer of outcomes. (Instiglio, 2015) 
The need for an adaptation from the model used for developed countries originated different 
nomenclatures for Impact Bonds directed to developed countries (Social Impact Bonds) and 
developing countries (Development Impact Bonds).  
 
Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) will be the center of study of this dissertation. There has 
been a continuous propaganda of the model for DIBs as a straightforward adaptation from the 
model of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs): simply put, switching governments for an external 
funder, for instance a development agency or charitable foundation (Instiglio, 2015). 
Nonetheless, as simple as the application of a DIB may seem, that is not what has been found 
in reality. Since 2015, when the first DIB was launched, the DIB market counts with only 2 
DIBs. (Social Finance, 2017) 
 
Why such a disparity in the number of SIBs and DIBs that make to the market? 
 
This question originated a further interest on how the change in one of the main actors 
involved would impact the underlying principles of DIBs and SIBs.  
This thesis will focus on analyzing the structural change of replacing the government entity 
for an external entity in the DIB model, in order to find how such modification will affect the 
underlying principles of the DIB (section 2.1). In the end, the proposed DIB model will be 
applied to a real case of an NGO in Mozambique, Girl Move, which fights Low School 
Attainment for Girls. 
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II. Literature Review 
1. Payment by Results Models 
A characteristic feature of a PbR mechanism is measuring results in terms of outcomes instead 
of outputs. The difference can be exemplified by the following: If a government is aiming to 
improve learning outcomes in schools, investment could either be either allocated to outputs 
“investment would buy training for 1000 professors” or on outcomes “investment would 
generate an increase in average exams’ score “. 
 
 
Figure 1  Definitions: Inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes, impact 
1.1. Rationale 
Capital is directed towards specific activities in order to fight a social issue, and on a later 
stage, the intervention’s outcomes are measured by an independent entity, to certify if the pre-
stablished results were achieved. If so, a third stakeholder, denominated outcome payer, will 
repay service providers their initial investment. (Pearson, Johnson, & Ellison, 2010) 
In the PbR mechanism there are five crucial roles that must be performed: Service Provider, 
Investor, Outcome Payer, Intermediary and Independent Evaluator. In some situations, the 
service provider assumes the role of investor, therefore pre-financing its own activities 
(Pearson, Johnson, & Ellison, 2010).  
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Figure 2 PbR Rationale- Social Provider is Investor 
 
Figure 3PbR Rationale- Social Provider does not assume Investor role 
 
1.1.1. Description of Key Stakeholders 
The investor, service provider and outcome payer’s role are the basis of a PbR mechanism. It 
is among them that the money flows in order to finance the intervention. The intermediary 
and outcome evaluator are not imperative for the existence of this model, but on the other 
hand, they are important for its validity and wel-functioning (Social Finance, 2017). 
 
1.1.1.1. Investor(s)  
This role is atributed to the entity that finances the intervention, bearing the risk in case the 
project fails. In other words, if the outlined outcomes are not reached at the end of the period 



























estment. Occasionaly, the entity who assumes 
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the role of service provider can also be the investor, if it has enough funds and is willing to 
assume the risk of non-deliver of the agreed outcomes.  
 
When an entity other than the service provider decides to join a PbR mechanism as an investor, 
there are two main components that might have driven to this decision, financial return and/or 
social return.  
 
 
Figure 4 Investors- Types 
Still, it cannot be said that these two components are equally important for every investor. As 
investor’s motivations change, so does change the aversion to risk, creating a spectrum of 
capital that ranges from financial-return-first to social-return-first. There can be recognized 
three types of investors according to motivations (Trelstad, 2009). 
 
Profit investors: The focus is financial return first. They may be attracted to PbR purely on 
the basis that they offer a chance to make a financial return on investment.  Private equity 
investors develop program-related investment with Clients interest in social return being a 
motivating factor for these institutions to be involved (Trelstad, 2009). 
Examples of possible entities to assume this role: Private Equity Investors, High Net Worth 
Individuals, Commercial Banks, Credit Unions. 
 
Impact Investors: Are defined as someone who takes a double bottom line approach to their 
capital, and attributes real value to the social or environmental return in their investment 
decision making. They will often, but not always, be willing to exchange a lower economic 
Adapted from: 
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return for potential social or environmental impact. Foundations can either assume the role of 
Impact or Philanthropic Investors, while Impact Investment Firms have focus on the duality 
of impact and return. High Net Worth Individuals can also fit in this profile. (Trelstad, 2009) 
 
Philanthropic Investors: At the other end of the spectrum are Philanthropic Investors. In 
contrast to a profit investor, who will seek to maximize financial return, a Philanthropic 
investor primarily cares about maximizing social return. Foundations can be motivated by the 
opportunity to make program-related investments, which allows them to earn back their 
money and recycle funding into other grant or investments, to foundations that are comfortable 
making a high risk, potentially non-recoverable investment. (Trelstad, 2009) 
 
1.1.1.2. Service Provider  
The Service Provider has to work with the targeted population and deliver the social outcomes 
defined in the contract, being expected to provide an innovative intervention to originate the 
estimated results. It receives the funds from the investors or via the intermediary to be used as 
working capital. (So & Jagelewski, 2013) 
A service provider can be one of the following entities: Non-profit or nongovernmental 
organization, public sector service provider, cooperative, non-profit or for-profit social 
enterprise and for-profit business.   
 
1.1.1.3. Outcome Payer(s)  
After results are assessed, this entity will disburse capital to investors, depending on the pre-
established levels of success. Therefore, in case of success this stakeholder will potentially 
pay for the whole project, sometimes even with a premium. As it will be seen, these entities 
assume such obligations because there might be financial incentives involved in the form of 
future savings and/or the desire to create impact.  
This role can be assumed by a varied spectrum of stakeholders: public sector entity, aid 
agencies, philanthropists, trust funds, foundations, impact investment firms, community 
development financial institutions, CSR units from large corporations, etc. These entities aim 
to allocate financing more ethically and in ways that were more aligned with their missions. 
(Wright & Gardiner, 2015) 
 
Mafalda Henriques Simões 15 
1.1.1.4. Independent Outcome Evaluator 
The evaluator is an independent organism that determines whether the previously established 
outcomes were reached by the end of the time period. Such outcomes are set for every Key 
Performance Indicator (KPI) or Indicator, which aim to measure the success of the 
intervention. If the goal-values for outcomes were reached, this information is passed on to 
the outcome payers, who will reimburse the investment. (Wright & Gardiner, 2015) Possible 
evaluators are consulting firms, research institution, university and government agencies.  
  
1.1.1.5. Intermediary/ Performance manager 
It is an entity that brings together the project’s stakeholders and manages its’ relationships in 
order to build the best possible contract that fits the needs and capabilities of every part (Peña, 
2014). The intermediary is in charge of receiving the funds from the investors and passing 
them on to the service providers, as well as receiving the payment from the outcome funders 
and making outcome payments to investors. When the service provider is assuming the 
investor role, the intermediary will only have one financial flow with the service provider, to 
transfer the funds from the outcome payers. This role is particularly important in complex 
structures with multiple investors and/or multiple service providers.  
 
1.2. Types of Payment by Results models 
Within the scope of Payment by Results there are variations in nomenclature that depend on 
the type of entity who assumes the roles of service provider, investor and outcome payer. Such 
variations are Results Based Aid, Results Based Finance, Hybrid Results Based 
Aid/Financing, Social Impact Bonds and Development Impact Bonds, the latter being the 
central focus of this dissertation.  A major criterion for RBA, RBF and HRB, is that the service 
provider pre-finances its own activities, therefore assuming the role of investor as well (detail 
description of these models can be found in (appendix 1). (Pearson, Johnson, & Ellison, 2010) 
Oppositely for impact bonds, it is common for both roles to be executed by independent 
entities, ie, the investor’s role is assumed by an entity other than the service provider, and the 
service provider only executes the intervention.  
 
1.3. Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) 
A drawback of the presented mechanisms is that often the service provider cannot undertake 
the investor’s role (especially in the social sector) since it does not have the capital to assume 
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the risk of failure and does not have the liquidity to pre-finance the intervention (Nonprofit 
Finance Fund, 2017). Thus, was developed in 2010 the impact bond model that brings a new 




Figure 5 SIB Rationale 
A SIB works as the previous PbRs models, except the investor role is assumed by an entity 
other than the service provider. In short, a SIB is a partnership among one or more service 
providers, investor(s) and outcome payer(s), where results are evaluated by an independent 
entity (outcome evaluator). The information and capital flows among stakeholders are 
managed by the intermediary. Investors provide up-front working capital directly to socialy 
driven service providers (direct structure) or via the intermediary (indirect structure) 
(appendix 2). In the end of the intervention, if the service provider reaches al proposed results, 
then the outcome payers, usualy the Government or other public entities, wil repay investors 
(principal plus return). If not, investors wil not be refunded from outcome payers. (DEAR, et 
al., 2016) 
Another natural feature of a SIB is its aim to tackle societal problems in developed countries. 
The entity who repays investors, in case of success, is a country’s government that by tackling 
a social issue wil have long term social and financial benefits. As for the funding, it may 
come from impact investors or for-profit investors. If the service provider originates sizable 
impact with the intervention, then investors wil have their investment repaid plus additional 
returns; otherwise they wil lose the capital. (DEAR, et al., 2016) 
Ifsuccessfulresultsare 
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Let’s suppose the folowing figure describes a SIB where government wishes to reduce 
unemployment by funding the outcomes of an intervention to unemployed individuals that 
wil cost 40M euros. In a status quo position (i.e., without any intervention) the government 
would spend 100M with these individuals in unemployment benefits, food assistance, etc. 
After developing the SIB, the outcomes generated (higher employment, therefore leading to 
less unemployment benefits and related expenses and higher tax revenues) wil produce 
financial gains to the government by saving $75M of the initial $100M expenditure. These 
savings are enough to repay the investors $40M and stil keep a $35M margin of savings. 
 
Figure 6 SIB- Savings for Government1 
 
These atractive features of SIB’s have led this mechanism to be adopted by governments of 
developed countries to fight social problems within their societies. 
 
1.3.1. SIBs Market 
According to Social Finance database, a total of 87 SIBs were launched since 2010, raising an 
estimate of $320M and impacting 113,643 lives. So far, the country that has launched more 
SIBs was the United Kingdom, with 33 bonds and £35,7M of capital raised. The biggest bond 
launched was the Peterborough bond, coincidently also the first ever developed SIB in the 
world. Aiming to fight re-ofending, it raised £5M and positively impacted 2000 short-term 
ofenders by reducing their rate of re-ofense after leaving jail.  
The second biggest country on SIBs development is the United States of America, where 16 
SIBs were already launched, with $178M of capital raised and 21,237 lives touched. The 
biggest SIB in terms of capital raised was launched in South Carolina in February of 2016, 
                         
1 Social Finance, 2017 
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raising $30M in capital to invest in Early Childhood Development. The third country is The 
Netherlands, with 7 SIBs launched and €10,5M raised. The biggest SIB raised €3M.   
Portugal has launched 4 SIBs, 2 in Oporto. Fundão and Lisbon, totaling €1,72M of capital 
raised and an estimate of 611 lives touched. The SIB in Fundão was the biggest one with 
€0.7M raised for 180 young unemployed adults learning software programming.  
 
1.3.2. Stakeholders’ motivations  
The reason for being possible to develop a mechanism like a SIB is due the different 
motivations for each stakeholder: 
 Social providers receive funding from investors to finance their activities and to 
develop innovative solutions that later on can be scalable/ applicable to other 
interventions. If well applied, this can be used as a method to create financial 
sustainability for the social provider. 
 Outcome payers in a SIB are governmental entities that desire to tackle a social 
problem of their society.  By having the private sector (investors) upfront funding the 
interventions it allows the government to shift financial risk to them. If the SIB is 
successful, it will diminish the negative externalities of the social problem and 
consequently of the spending associated to it, even after paying for the cost of the 
intervention, therefore creating a financial gain in form of savings. 
  SIB Investors are individuals or organizations from the private sector that embrace 
hybrid incentives, risk and impact. When the outcomes are met, investors receive the 
previous investment plus some level of return. This is possible since the SIB generates 
savings on the government’s budget.   
 
In conclusion, a Social Impact Bond is targeted to developed countries and potentiates benefits 
to the all involved stakeholders: the social provider receives funding for its activities, the 
investor applies capital to projects with the perspective of having returns and impact, and the 
government diminishes negative externalities and has financial gains (savings) if the 
intermediary confirms that the goals were met. (DEAR, et al., 2016) 
 
The increased use of the SIBs mechanisms for developed countries opened an opportunity to 
apply the impact bond model in developing countries, which are called Development Impact 
Bonds (DIBs).  
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1.4. Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) 
The DIB market is still rather small when compared with SIBs. So far, only 2 DIBs were 
launched: “India’s Education DIB”, targeting a total of 19,000 young girls, and “Asháninka 
cocoa and coffee DIB” in Peru, focusing on 99 cocoa and farm producers (Social Finance, 
2017). 
Several entities have claimed to be currently developing DIB’s, however, “for every 10 DIBs 
that are discussed, in-depth work is done on three to four and likely only one goes through”, 
said Avnish Gungadurdoss, co-founder and managing director at Instiglio. It is intriguing why 
so many SIBs are launched while DIBs experience an opposite reality: in seven years 87 SIBs 
were launched against 2 DIBs.  
After analyzing both the launched DIBs and the available literature on the topic, it is possible 
to observe a direct adoption of the SIB’s structure in the DIBs’ model, with one difference: 
the outcome payer role typically can no longer be assumed by governments. An explanation 
for the failure in deploying DIBs might thus be in its own conceptualization which does not 
include the necessary changes originated from switching from a Developed Country context 
to Developing Countries.  
 
The following section will analyze the model currently adopted for DIBs and the changes that 
should be implemented, therefore suggesting a new model for DIBs. 
 
1.4.1. Rationale 
In a developing country context, the government will not be a suitable payer of outcomes 
considering that it has restrained financial means and usually political instability, indicating 
to investors a low probability of payment and consequently that the DIB would be high risk. 
As a solution, the DIB structure replaces the governmental entity for an external outcomes 
funder, typically an aid agency.  
 
On the only two DIBs already launched, apart from the outcome payer, whose role was 
assumed by aid agencies on both DIBs, the structures were found to be similar to a SIB: service 
provider receives money from investors, and if outcomes are met, outcome payers will return 
the capital plus a financial return to investors.  
 
Mafalda Henriques Simões 20 
 
Figure 7 SIB and DIB Rationale- Contrast 
 
However, some issues arise from the fact that in a DIB there is no longer a governmental 
entity involved as outcome payer, as other type of entities must assume this role and there is 
a shift in expectations: 
i. The impact originated from a DIB can no longer be measured in terms of financial 
gains (savings) for the government, considering that it is no longer one of the main 
DIB’s stakeholders. Being the outcome payer role now assumed by Aid Agencies, a 
potential new measure for impact could be the “gains” that were brought for the 
economy due the DIB.  
i. Outcome payers wil have to finance the principal plus return, which might raise 
dificulties on finding donor agencies wiling to pay the return component. On the 
other hand, if return is not part of the deal then commercial and impact investors may 
lose interest on financing the DIB. 
 
Having such concerns in consideration, one of the goals of this thesis is to design a new DIB’s 
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III. Thesis’ Contributions 
2. DIBs: A new conceptualization 
The last section concluded by stating that DIBs should not be a straightforward adaptation of 
SIBs, and pointed out two issues as probable causes for the low number of DIB’s launched so 
far. Having such issues in consideration, the aim of this chapter is to design a DIB model that 
overcomes such problems. As a result, it is expected that this new approach will make DIBs 
an easier and better understood form of financial mechanism to be adopted for developing 
countries  
 
2.1. DIB Model Specifications 
The absence of a government authority as outcome payer in a DIB is the starting point to 
require changes in its structure. In a SIB, governments assume the role of ultimate payers 
because the impact originated with the intervention will bring improvements on a social issue 
that consequently led to short-term and long-term financial savings to the public budgets. 
Therefore, by engaging in a successful SIB, the government has economic and financial gains, 
in addition to the improvement in the social problem. 
In a DIB, the developing country’s government is not assuming the payment in case of success 
due the lack of financial means, lack of outcome orientation or merely inefficiency. The 
capital will have to be disbursed by an external entity whose interests are aligned with the 
DIB’s social issue.  
While a SIB generated savings for the public authorities of the targeted country who serve as 
outcome payers, in a DIB, the savings component does not exist for the outcome payer, only 
remaining incentives in the form of economic and well-being benefits for society. 
This reasoning suggest that the outcome payer will have to be an entity that is comfortable 
with the role of only acquiring impact, whereas governments were also accomplishing budget 
improvements in the form of higher savings. The proposal is that entities who focus on 
allocating capital in exchange for impact and do not have financial returns as incentive, 
assume the role of outcome payers. However, this creates potential problems for the DIB 
model: 
 
i. The outcome payments for a DIB can no longer be determined based on financial 
savings. 
A great deal of SIBs establishes the payment of outcomes based on  
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- the intervention costs (how much was spent to fund the intervention), 
- potential savings (how much the government saved with the intervention), and, 
- return for investors (how much should investors get back as return?). 
 
A solution is to atribute a value to the DIB that is linked to the impact it generates rather than 
with the direct financial results of the intervention (returns or savings). Measuring in terms of 
financial gains would mean accounting for the savings on social benefits and gains in taxes, 
but this is not what is it aimed to be measured. The design of the DIB mechanism is to replace 
returns and center fuly on originated impact, making the outcome payments based on the 
value of economic gains generated from the intervention. Economic gains or economic 
opportunity costs, is a measure of calculating macroeconomic gains [Buckup, 2009], in this 
specific case of tackling a social issue. For instance, in the case of one extra person starting to 
work, the economic gain could be measured by the additional potential earnings for this 
person, also known as cost of opportunity of being unemployed. If the life time economic 
gains would totalize 100,000€ for one individual who would start to work, then the outcome 
payment would be calculated in reference to this value.  
For coherence reasons, the nomenclature of outcome payer, from now on, wil be Impact 
Payer, since the payments are no longer based on outcomes but rather on impact and what we 
are proposing is in fact an Impact market. 
 
Figure 8 SIB, Traditional DIB and New DIB Rationale- Contrast 
 








































might raise dificulties on finding entities wiling to pay the return component. On the 
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other hand, if return is not part of the deal then some investors may lose interest on 
financing the DIB. 
 
Outcome payers will allocate money for impact and get no financial benefit. Consequently, 
the following question arises: “Considering there are no financial gains for Aid Agencies, will 
they be willing to pay returns to investors?” 
In a SIB perspective, it made sense for governments to pay returns: investors were the risk 
takers and the outcome payments were lower than the savings generated for the government.   
The solution proposed for DIBs is to redefine the goals/motivations of investors. Depending 
on the success of the intervention, investors would receive back a portion of the total 
investment made, instead of receiving principal plus returns. Their initial financial allocation 
can be called redeemable grants linked to outcomes from the perspective of Philanthropic 
Investors. In other words, a higher portion of the grant is given back to the impact 
philanthropist if better outcomes are achieved, up to the full amount.  For this to happen, the 
key element is finding entities, for the investor role, who perceive a DIB as way to expedite 
their budget and therefore leverage other investment opportunities. Philanthropists or 
foundations would be suitable performers for this role. Both entities have established annual 
budgets, where capital must be allocated to projects that have higher return of impact.  
 
2.2. DIB Development Process and Rationale 
There is no specific stakeholder mandated to assume the initiator role when it comes to a DIB. 
The initiative of starting to develop such mechanism can come from an impact payer that 
wishes to focus on a specific social issue, or from a service provider that seeks funds for its 
activities within a developing country. Nevertheless, after the DIB development is 
implemented and all the contracts among stakeholders are closed, the rationale of the DIB 
must be the following: 
i. Investors transfer agreed capital to the service provider (directly or indirectly). This 
value must be equivalent to the estimated costs of the intervention. 
ii. Service provider funds its activities and starts intervention on the population, with the 
agreement of reaching and/or exceeding established outcomes.  
iii. After a pre-determined time (can be after the first intervention, first set of outcomes 
measured, or in the end of the project) an independent evaluator will confirm if the 
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established impact, for each indicator, was reached. Such information is then 
forwarded to impact payers. 
iv. Impact payers shal reimburse investors an amount of capital equivalent to the 
achieved impact. The impact payment to be reimbursed wil be linked to the economic 
gains generated from the intervention. Such value wil be specified in the contracts. 
 
 
Figure 9New DIB- Rationale 
 
To sum up, the essence of a DIB is to direct funding towards innovative and effective 
interventions to fight a social issue, and the success of a DIB is dependent on the additional 
macroeconomic benefits generated by the funded intervention.  
Nevertheless, finding the right intervention to be funded and establishing a final payment 
based on economic gains are dificult tasks. For that reason, the next section wil propose a 
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2.3. Impact Framework: Assessing the Social Issue and Economic Gains 
Another contribution of this thesis is to suggest the application of Problem Tree Analysis tool, 
to support the tasks of “choosing an effective intervention” and “measure economic gains/ 
macroeconomic benefits”.  
 
 
Figure 10 Problem Tree Analysis 
The scheme assembles a tree-structure, where the roots symbolize the causes of the problem 
and the branches the consequent effects. According to (Santos, Salvado, Carvalho, & 
Azevedo, 2016), this tool “promotes the understanding of the anatomy of the societal problem 
through the identification of its causes and effects and the causality that links them”. Once the 
direct causes of the main problem are found the exercise should continue to find the causes of 
the direct causes, and so on. The same method must be applied to the effects but instead of 
revealing underlying motives the goal is to find consequent effects of the main issue, direct 
effects, and then consequences of the direct effect. 
 
The link between the tree analysis and previous tasks is the following: the underlying causes 
of the issue will help on choosing interventions that are tailored to fight the origins of the 
societal problem; the effects analysis will allow to measure the economic gains generated from 
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Figure 11 Impact Framework 
2.3.1. Causes: choosing an effective intervention 
Knowing the main causes of a problem is vital to proceed with the selection of an effective 
solution (Santos, Salvado, Carvalho, & Azevedo, 2016). In this context, it will allow to choose 
a service provider whose solution is tackling the roots of the problem (or at least one relevant 
and neglected root cause).  
 
2.3.2. Effects: Measuring economic gains 
Effects can be can be interpreted as symptoms of a “disease” that has not been solved, being 
clear that there is an associated cost that could have been avoided with the right intervention. 
This “disease-symptoms” analogy can be applied to the context of societal problems. When 
fitting interventions are not applied, hence permitting the problem to persist, there is a 
consequent loss of potential economic gains (or opportunity costs).  
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The micro-example for the effects’ analysis will be succinctly applied to the social issue of 
“Childhood obesity”. One direct effect of the social issue 
is poor physical health that leads to an increase in lifetime 
medical costs. The latter is seen as the ultimate effect of 
the problem, and that way will have a cost associated, in 
this case 93.000$ (Matthew Kasman, 2015). This amount 
means that a child that suffers from obesity will impose 
costs that a non-obese child won’t, or in another word, an 
obese child that receives a fitting treatment and therefore 
loses weigh and avoids obesity will have generate 
economic gains amounting 93,000$, that can be reflected, in this case, in form of increased 
productivity and lower health costs. 
 
The measurement of economic gains values must be computed specifically for the country in 
analysis, which in some cases might be limited due to the lack of data for some countries. 
Therefore, two approaches are suggested, Direct Values and Reference Values. 
 Direct values: is applied when there is sufficient data for the country under analysis. 
 Reference Values: is used when there is not enough data for the country, requiring 
using a “proxy country”. In this context, a proxy country is described as a country that 
presents similar results for indicators related to the social issue.  
 
2.3.3. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
The establishment of KPIs is one of the key concerns of DIBs and SIBs. To be able to evaluate 
if the intervention is being successful, indicators are established, they will provide the 
stakeholders of the DIB with a measure for success. Depending on the impact results for each 
indicator, an impact payment will be made.  
2.3.3.1. Goals  
The goals of a KPI must translate the main purpose of the DIB. By re-using the example of a 
DIB aiming to reduce unemployment, possible KPIs could be “Entrance in the job market” 
and “Maintenance of employment after 6 months”, which metrics could be, “number of 









Figure 13 Impact Framework- Effects of 
Childhood Obesity 
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2.3.3.2. Impact baseline  
Each KPI will have an “impact baseline” so that the additionality of the intervention can be 
measured. This value reflects the results that would have been expected (in the targeted 
country) if there was no DIB intervention plus an error margin, depending on the confidence 
of the values collected. For example, when considering two scenarios: without the DIB 200 
out of 1000 people would be employed; and with the DIB 350 people got employed, the DIB 
would only start to generate impact from the 201st person onwards, because the first 200 would 
have been employed anyway. In this case, impact is equivalent to 150 additional people 
integrated into the job market due to the intervention.  
Thus, “impact” will be referred as results that would not have been achieved without the 
intervention (additionally), while impact baseline will be the reference value after which 
impact is created.  
 
2.3.3.3. Unitary Economic Gain (UEG) and Economic Gains (EG) 
Each KPI has a “unitary economic gain” (economic gain per individual), representing the 
macroeconomics benefits per additional outcome achieved that would not exist without the 
successful intervention. A KPI is selected depending if there are measurable and independent 
EG for that indicator. A DIB can be evaluated based on 2, 3 or even 4 KPI’s, but only if each 
one of them translates into EG that does not overlap with any other KPI, or, if it does, all can 
be computed independently (ex: for the indicators “number of people who maintained the job 
over 6 months” and “number of people who maintained the job over 9 months”, the last 
indicator’s UEG should be computed based on the EGs generated from the last 3 months of 
employment). Such rule allows to calculate a total potential EG, generated from the DIB for 
each unit of additional successful intervention (e.g., economic value of one extra person being 
long-term employed)  
Referring to the previous example, this EG is only computed for the impact originated from 
the intervention, which according to the last example, would be applied to 150 individuals. 
These individuals times the UEG of the KPI (ex: 150 individuals x 3000€ per individual) 
would originate 450,000€ in EG for this (single) KPI. When is mentioned “Total Economic 
Gains” (TEG), it refers to the sum of all KPIs’ EG.  
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2.3.4. Impact payments´ formula 
In many launched SIBs and DIBs, payments per KPI were computed based on the intervention 
costs and returns for investors, with financial incentives being the center of the reasoning since 
the payments should be enough to attract the investors but not too large that would offset the 
financial savings of the government.  
 
The proposed DIB approach will calculate the Total Impact Payment (TIP) based on the EG 
and impact of each KPI. These values refer to the total amount of disbursed capital, referring 
to all KPIs, from outcome payers.  This will be based on a formula of continual results rather 
than discrete, as any extra individual successfully intervened must be considered as impact. 
Additionally, the capital disbursement for this DIB will aim to provide investors some agility 
in their budgets by paying a percentage of the total costs of intervention.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×  𝛴(𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
 
2.3.4.1. Payment Rate 
The payment rate is the percentage that is applied to the TEGs of both KPIs, originating the 
respective Impact Payment (IP). The sum of IP of both KPIs results in the TIP.  
 
The payment rate is established based on the average of Impact originated for each KPI on the 
entire initiative. For example, if the DIB encompasses 2 interventions(one per year) and 
measures 2 KPIs, possible impact results for each year could be for KPI1 (20%, 25%) and 
KPI2 (15%, 20%). The average impact for KPI1 is 22.5% and for KPI2 17.5%, therefore the 
impact of the DIB is 20%, and so this would be the payment rate applied. 
As the impact originated increases so does increase the payment rate until it reaches the limit 
of maximum impact possible. The lower limit of payment rate is 0%, in case no impact is 
created, while the upper limit refers to the scenario where the impact created is equal to the 
potential impact (If DIB targets 1000 people and the impact baseline is 200, the potential 
impact is 800). 
 
2.3.4.1. Impact 
It measures the outcomes achieved for each KPI and subtracts to the respective impact 
baseline. If the impact baseline were to be 200 employed individuals out of 1000 and the 
intervention reached 350 individuals, then the impact would be 150. 
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2.3.4.2. IRAC 
This thesis will evaluate the attractiveness/efficiency of a DIB for investors based on Impact 
Return on Allocated Capital, a ratio of the TEG and the intervention’s Total Allocated Capital 
(TAC): 
𝐼𝑅𝐴𝐶 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝐸𝐺)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝑇𝐴𝐶)
 
 
The nominator term, TEG, refers to the sum of the EG of each indicator. As for the 
denominator, TAC, is the amount that impact payers will disburse (Impact Payment). 
IRAC will measure the amount of impact created per one euro allocated by impact payers. If 
it is equal to one, then the impact originated is equal to the money allocated in the intervention. 
For a DIB to be feasible, IRAC must be higher than 1. A DIB with an IRAC of 2 is already 
considered as relevant because the economic gains originated are superior to the twice the 
costs of the intervention. 
 
Besides the computation of TIP, it can also be computed micro-measures like the IP, and 
Unitary Impact Payment (UIP), that assess the payment per indicator and the payment per 
indicator per individual (respectively). Further development of these computations can be 
found in appendix 3. 
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IV. Practical application: Girls Education DIB 
The previous Part III developed a new model for Development Impact Bonds, contrasting 
with existing views on its conceptualization, specifically on the measurement of indicators, 
basing it on economic gains instead of financial incentives for the DIBs stakeholders. 
Consequently, to measure the economic gains, it is proposed the implementation of the Impact 
Framework.  
 
This Part IV is aimed to apply the insights developed in Part III, by describing the 
development of a DIB with the purpose of fighting low school attainment. It is divided in three 
chapters, starting by exploring the societal problem on a macro level (statistics on school 
attainment) and micro level (impact framework) The impact framework will lead to 
conclusions on a potential social provider, leading to the next chapter that will describe the 
social provider and how its interventions are aligned with the issue’s causes originated in the 
impact framework. The third, and last, chapter will be a comprehensive description of the 
development of the DIB.  
3. Low school attainment for girls: A social issue 
Education has been a central topic for many policymakers, especially in rural and poor areas 
of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, where tens millions of children grow 
up without receiving the most basic education (HERZ & SPERLING, 2004). The eagerness 
to promote education stepped outside the geographic borders of the concerned areas, with 
institutions like United Nations setting as the second Millennium Development Goal and 
Beyond 2015 “Achieve Universal Primary Education”, with the aim to “Ensure that, by 2015, 
children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling” (United Nations, 2015) 
According to the World Bank, more than half of girls in sub-Saharan Africa —54 percent—
do not complete even a primary school education. Another study shows that 15 million girls 
of primary-school age will never get the chance to learn to read or write in primary school 
compared to about 10 million boys. (UNESCO, 2016).  Such findings on school attainment 
are alone alarming, but they become more intriguing when research confirms that investing in 
girls’ education originates high returns in a micro and macro context: “Providing girls one 
extra year of education beyond the average boosts eventual wages by 10–20 percent” 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2010). This conclusion matches so many other reports on the 
positive impact originated from investing in girls. Studies on the quantity of schooling have 
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provided strong evidence that extra education for girls in developing countries has a 
considerable impact in girls’ life’s but also produces economic gains at a macroeconomic level 
(Dollar & Gatti, 1999). These substantial conclusions on the topic have channeled billions of 
dollars of aid towards interventions and policies with the purpose of tackling the “low quantity 
of schooling” issue. This DIB aims to tackle exactly this same issue, by introducing an impact 
payment model. 
 
The already existing background for a DIB in Education together with the data just provided, 
were strong contributors for this thesis to pursue the elaboration of a DIB in the education 
sector, specifically in school attainment for girls, by targeting a country in sub-saharan Africa, 
Mozambique. This country presents weaknesses in the educational context that must be 
fought, highlighting the low results of primary and secondary attainment (UNESCO, 2015) 
which, according to research, would provide great economic gains if increased.   
 
It is possible to find an overview of School attainment in Mozambique in appendix 4. The 
existing data allows to realize how low school attainment either for boys and girls is, and 
evaluate the existing gender gaps. All educational variables (Net enrolment rate of primary 
education, the rate of students enrolled in the last year of primary school and intake on 
secondary level) presented lower values for females than boys.  
 
Subsequently to the macro analysis, we are going to apply the Impact framework to break 
down the social issue into causes and effects.  
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3.1. Impact Framework application: Assessing the social issue and macroeconomic 
value 
As previously mentioned, the impact framework is a tool that helps analysing which are the 
causes and consequent effects of a social issue. Despite the apparent simplicity this tool can 
be quite powerful on the context of a DIB. The assessment of causes gives light into what 
root-issues the DIB should attack while the quantification of the affects allows, in an ultimate 
stage, to understand the EG (in terms of % of GDP or $) that could be added to the country if 
the social issue under analysis had been fought.  
 
3.1.1. Causes for Low school attainment of girls 
Research concentrated in the sub-Saharan Africa concluded several major causes for girls stop 
attending school: big distances from home to school, hostile environment at school, early 
pregnancy and/or marriage, poor health and menstruation, as others. Each of these direct 
causes will have underlying causes, and so on, reaching the roots of the issue, which can be 
found in figure 14.  
 
To have a perception of how to interpret the tree analysis consider the following example: It 
was found that parents are discouraged from investing in girls’ studies. Such is the result of 
high direct and indirect costs of schooling, such the payment of fees, buying uniforms, 
materials and dislocation expenses. Despite these being applied for both girls and boys, this 
motive is stronger for girls since they dedicate a great deal of their time providing unpaid labor 
at home. By attending to school, it implies loss of free labor. A third consequence is the broad 
wage gender gap favoring boys, discouraging parents to invest in girls when there are boys at 
home. By digging deeper, it can be concluded that the causes for these three problems can be 
associated with the lack of investment from the government on education (on school fees 
exemption, offering uniforms, etc.) and the cultural mindset of the role of women in society.  
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Figure 14 Tree Analysis2 
                                                 
2 Tree analysis elaborated by the thesis’ author, with following references: (Maia, 2008); (Rihani, s.d.); (Alvarez, 
et al., 2003); (Kondylis & Manacorda, 2006); (Shahidul & Karim, 2015); (Walque & Valente, 2016); (Sonia 
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3.1.1.1. Choosing an effective intervention 
The roots of the core problem are interpreted as the challenges that the social provider needs 
to tackle with the intervention in order for it to be successful. In the case of school attainment 
research showed that some of the causes for this problem to persist are: Cultural mindset, lack 
of sexual education and girl empowerment for young people, low access to information and 
to right nutrition, lack of inspection systems to prevent violence, lack of investment from the 
government, and others.  
Having in consideration these root causes and the local where the intervention is aimed at, the 
country of Mozambique, it was found a NGO which intervention addresses many of the 
indicated causes and that operates in Mozambique: Girl Move. A further study of Girl Move 
and its interventions will be made in the next Chapter 4.  
 
3.1.2. Effects for Low school attainment of girls 
After the causes are defined, the next step is to consider the effects that this problem has 
originated. Loss of education and income growth, perpetuation of educated families, higher 
probability of contracting HIV, and lower of women empowerment are just a few of many 
possible consequences.  Taking the example of a “loss of productivity”, the second effects can 
be slowing country’s development and economic growth, which according to Paul Schultz 
“returns to female secondary education are in the 15–25 percent range”.  
 
3.1.2.1. Measuring economic gains 
The economic gains from each symptom translate the benefits originated by the DIB that 
otherwise would not exist.  Still, not all of them are easily quantified in potential economic 
gains and the amount of available evidence might not be sufficient to provide a reliable result. 
As such, based on the tree analysis and on research, this thesis will compute the EG based on 
the loss of potential productivity for girls who withdraw from school early.  
If girls stay in school they will have higher education and associated to that considerable 
higher salaries. Of course, this reasoning is quite broad because wages vary significantly 
according to the level of education (Murphy, 1992). To be aligned with the Millennium 
Development Goals on achieving universal primary education, it is going to be assessed the 
economic gains generated if a girl finishes primary school. 
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 Methodology for measuring loss of potential productivity 
This methodology will be adapted from the findings of Jad Chaaban 2001 on the paper 
“Measuring the economic gains of investing in girls”. 
 
Loss of potential productivity or loss of potential earnings due to lower education will be 
computed based on the average wage (a proxy for productivity) of girls who finish primary 
level compared with girls who do not. The goal is to obtain the lifetime costs of girls leaving 
primary school (independently of the level in primary school).  The paper develops its 
methodology based on the total “lifetime earnings differential” that is obtained by subtracting 
total lifetime earnings for an individual who completed primary education, by the total lifetime 
earnings for an individual with an incomplete primary education.  To compute the lifetime 
loss in earnings for all the girls [in a country] who were not in school at a given year, it is 
multiplied the lifetime earnings differential by the number of students in the population who 
did not go on to continue their education. As conclusion, the article computes these costs for 
several countries in value (millions of dollars) or as percentage of the country’s GDP.  
 
To put the pieces together: This DIB aims to increase school attainment for girls in 
Mozambique. To measure the economic gains generated it will be computed the “lifetime loss 
in earnings for all the girls who were not in school at a given year”.  
Taking Senegal as an example, the cost of all the girls dropping out of primary school is 
$2801M, according to the same article. If a DIB was able to decrease the country’s primary 
school dropout [for girls] by 10%, roughly $280.1M of economic gains would be generated 
in terms of potential earnings.  (Chaaban & Cunningham, 2011) 
 
The next step, and goal of this section, is to compute the lifetime costs of a girl abandoning 
primary school for Mozambique. This same article does not present values for Mozambique 
and to use the described methodology it would be necessary to have the average wages for 
each level of education (wage for concluded primary school and wage for incomplete primary 
school) which is rather difficult to obtain.  
A possible solution to obtain the EG is through a proxy country, as mentioned in section 3, 
implicating that the EG for Mozambique would be based on EG of another country of the 
report. This encompasses on selecting a country that presents similar strategic key indicators, 
ie, indicators that reflect the variables of the methodology and are available.  
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Because the methodology used to compute the life time cost of early school leaving was based 
on average wages and these were not found for Mozambique, it will be used the household 
consumption as a proxy indicator. However, average household consumption alone is not 
sufficient, as a centrality measure it does not provide the distribution of wealth. It is added 
Gini index to measure income distribution.  
There were found strong similarities between Mozambique and Senegal, presenting the 
following results: for household consumption Mozambique spends on average $13.189PPP 
for all categories while Senegal $11.430PPP; as for the Gini index both have similar 
distribution of wealth, Senegal has 40.3 while Mozambique 45.7. Both countries present a 
considerable high level of inequality. 
From this point forward, the cost associated to Senegal will be adopted by Mozambique, but 
first is necessary to eliminate the “population” factor, only then obtaining the cost associated 
to a single girl, which it will be assumed the same due the close results for household income 
and Gini Index.  
The paper computed for Senegal a total life time cost of early school leaving for girls of 
$2801M, referring to all the girl students in the population that dropped out from primary 
education. In order to obtain this value per girl the amount $2801M must be divided by the 
number of girls in the population (in the theoretical age group for primary education enrolled 
in that level)3 that dropped out from primary school. 
According to the report, for the year of 2004, 40% girls4 dropped out during the year, the 
equivalent to 356.760 girls (World Bank database). This results on a cost of 7851$. To 
conclude, for every girl that would drop out of school, but continued studying due the 
investment from the DIB, will provide an economic gain of 7851$. At an exchange rate of 
1USD to 0,894€, originates 7019€. 
  
                                                 
3 Source: WB EdStats, Population of the official age for primary education, female (number)=891,902 
 
4 Source: WB EdStats, derived from the variable ―net enrollment rates‖ at the primary and secondary level  
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4. Girl Move 
Girl Move is a Portuguese NGO founded in 2013, with headquarters in Nampula and branches 
in Lisbon and Maputo. Their activities are based in the areas of Napipine and Merrere.  Its 
mission is to empower, through education, Mozambican girls and women to become the main 
development agents of their country. In order to achieve such goal, Girl Move has developed 
two programs: The Mwarusi project and the Leadership Academy. Although both create great 
value for the girls and community, the focus of this thesis is on the Mwarusi project, which 
effort is on young girls. (Girl Move, 2017) 
 
4.1. Mwarusi Project 
The Mwarusi project focusses on 12 to 15-year-old young girls, denominated Mwarusis, who 
are attending 7th grade (final year of primary schooling) and are living in conditions of 
potential vulnerability in the  neighborhood of Marrere and Napipine (Girl Move, 2017). This 
project, which is centered on the Safe Spaces methodology, makes a contribution so that the 
adolescent girls from communities with limited resources in Nampula have: 
 Increased school rates retention 
 Greater access to good quality and relevant opportunities to develop life skills, such 
as: self-esteem, knowledge on health and hygiene and opportunities for personal 
development.  
 
4.1.1. Safe spaces Methodology 
Safe Spaces is a tested and proven methodology that involves a space provided by the 
community and then rehabilitated, where all the interaction, training and activities take place. 
Promoting a system of rules and schedules, elements of identity and belonging, this 
methodology promotes both the access and use of the education and health local resources, 
and the building up of knowledge and skills in different areas, i.e. social, economic and health 
domains, according to the group and the community needs. 
The Safe Spaces methodology is widely adopted for diverse causes, for instance Women and 
Girls Safe Spaces (WGSS) has emerged as a key strategy for the protection and empowerment 
of women and girls affected by the Syrian crisis and Child Friendly Spaces protects children 
(boys and girls) by providing a safe space with supervised activities. (UNICEF) 
According to United Nations, there are 7 principles to establish safe spaces for girls and 
women [appendix 5]: 
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 Leadership and empowerment of women and girls 
 Client/survivor centered 
 Safe and accessible 
 Community involvement 
 Coordinated and multisectoral  
 Tailored 
  
4.1.2. Safe spaces applied to the Mwarusi Project 
Girl Move has implemented the Safe Spaces methodology to the Mwarusi project, tailoring it 
according the girls needs in order to achieve the main goals of conclusion of primary school 
and transition to secondary school, consequently leading to a reduction in teenage pregnancy 
and child marriage.    
Every year, Girl Move works with 900 girls from the neighborhoods of Marrere and Napipine, 
providing 3h per week of modules of “Abilities for life” and study sessions, a total of 12h per 
month.  In addition, within the year, the girls receive at least 2 home visits from Girl Move. 
 
The program “Abilities for life” has the duration of one year, starting in February and ending 
in January, and is divided in 4 modules [figure 15]: I protect myself, I protect my body, I 
protect my money and I protect my education. Each module has a 3month duration and its 
sequence is fixed, allowing a growth in trust among the mwarusis and Girl Move. The reason 
for the module “I protect my education” being the last one is to coincide with the end of a 
school year and the beginning of a new one, which corresponds to the exams period to 
conclude primary school and the timing to register in secondary school.  
In total, 72h of lessons plus 72h of study sessions are given in the period of a year. 
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Figure 15 " Abilities for Life”- Program Structure 
However, such program could not be developed without the inspiration factor. Throughout 
the program the Mwarusis will be accompanied by Mwarusi Mentors (young women enrolled 
in University) and Girl Movers.  Girl Movers are Mozambican university graduated women 
who are enrolled in the “Advanced Program of Leadership and Entrepreneurship”, also 
developed by Girl Move.  One Girl Mover will give training and mentorship to 3 Mwarusi 









In conclusion, Girl Move provides a unique intervention for girls in Mozambique, by putting 
together a tailored school program along with older educated and ambitious women that are 
seen as an inspiration. (Girl Move, 2017) 
The uniqueness and success associated to Girl Move’s past intervention, in terms of impact, 
in Mozambique makes this NGO as a most adequate service provider for this DIB focused in 
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Figure 16 Abilities for Life”- Program 
Structure 
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5. Girls’ Education DIB 
The DIB targets 2700 girls enrolled in one of the six schools of the cities of Marrere and 
Napipine. The program has a duration of three years, which is equivalent to three interventions 
with 900 girls each. This information is summarized in the following table. 
 
Launch Date Fev 2018 
Conclusion Date Jan 2021 
Interventions (#) 3 (1 year each) 
Target Population (#) 2700 girls for 3 years 
Target Locations Marrere and Napipine (Mozambique) 
Total Intervention Costs (€) 801.3095 
Table 1 Intervention summary 
 
After the first intervention is concluded, the intermediary will compare the established results 
of each indicator with the respective impact baseline, therefore assessing the level of impact 
originated with the intervention. Such assessment will be made after each intervention, 
resulting in a total of three assessments.  
 
5.1. Stakeholders involved in the Girls Education's DIB 
This DIB will follow an Indirect Contracting structure, proposing the presence of an 
intermediary. The following image describes the structure of the DIB and specifies which 
entities are proposed to assume the roles of each stakeholder.  
                                                 
5 Detailed intervention costs in section 5.2.2 
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Figure 17 DIB Rationale- Girl Move 
 
5.1.1. Service Provider-GM 
Girl Move is the service provider in charge of executing activities on the field. In exchange of 
delivering specific results, it wil receive working capital from investors to fund its’ activities. 
 
5.1.2. Impact Payer(s) 
The role of outcome payer is to be assumed by Aid Agencies, or Foundations or the Social 
Responsibility units of large Portuguese corporations operating in Mozambique. Therefore, 
the folowing entities could be potential actors for this role. 
A suitable outcome payer for this DIB would be Calouste Gulbenkian (CG) foundation. As a 
foundation, CG provides financing to third-parties; Supports innovative projects that generate 
progress and adaptability to change, among other activities. (Gulbenkian Foundation- What 
we do, s.d.) 
Another possible entity is Camões- Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua Portugal. Camões, 
I.P. promotes, finances, co-finances and operates dozens of programmes […] particularly in 
Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and East Timor. (CAMOES, s.d.) 
Being the Education DIB an innovative financial mechanism that intends to generate progress 
and improve community’s standards, this would be aligned with these entities’ goals. 
On the private side, Portuguese companies that have operations in Mozambique could also be 
potential impact payers: Navigator, Petrogal6 , Mota-Engil, Teixeira Duarte, and others 
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5.1.3. Investor(s) 
In a DIB, this stakeholder is the one assuming all the risk, therefore having confidence on the 
service provider and on its capabilities of achieving results is crucial. 
The investor should be a venture philanthropist, someone with high proximity with the NGO 
and with the underlying cause of the DIB, educating young girls.  
 
5.1.4. Outcome Evaluator 
The more important feature of the outcome evaluator is its independency. The options for 
outcome evaluator would fall in the area of auditing firms who have the capability of providing 
unbiased results and show experience in the social area. Such examples would be KPMG, 
Deloitte or PWC. In addition, the branding associated to the size of these companies would 
be a positive factor to be associated with the DIB. According to the survey TOP100 companies 
in Mozambique for 2015, KPMG was the only auditing/consulting firm integrating this list, 
with total revenues, for the same year, amounting to 7 million of euros. Such penetration and 
knowledge in the market makes KPMG a strong(er) candidate to execute this role.  
 
5.1.5. Intermediary/ Performance Manager 
The intermediary role will be assumed by Laboratório de Investimento Social (LIS) from 
Lisbon. LIS has supported the development of the first SIB in Portugal and has a diverse 
experience with social finance, being an obvious choice for this DIB.  
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5.2. Interventions 
5.2.1. Intervention design 
 
 
Figure 18 Intervention Design 
The DIB intends to finance three interventions with a total of 2700 girls. The scheme in figure 
18 ilustrates how the interventions are planned. One intervention reaches 900 girls and has 
the duration of 12 months, starting in February 2018. In January of the folowing year, the 
intervention is concluded and a new sample of 900 girls wil start to be assisted again in 
February 2019, so on and so forth. For each year the 900 supported girls are divided into 30 
groups of 30 girls. The methodology of Safe Spaces is applied to each group and is coordinated 
by 1 Girl Mover and 3 Mwarusi mentors. 
 
5.2.2. Intervention costs 
The intervention costs wil be the base to estimate the working capital needed for the service 
provider to execute its activities during duration of the program. Therefore, summing up the 
annual amounts of capital wil lead to the total investment needed, from investors, in order for 
the DIB to be feasible. 
The intervention costs are divided in two major groups, direct costs and indirect costs. Yearly 
costs were assumed to be constant, the variations occur in a monthly frequency [appendix 6]. 
Table 2 shows that the component with higher costs is the Personnel, which is explained by 
the number of people who intervene in the Mwarusi project. For instance, per intervention 
(year) there are involved 30 Girl Movers and 90 Mentors (1GM+ 3Mentors per 30 mwarusis, 
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as seen before), amounting to costs of 80.400€ (these yearly costs exclude the managing team 
from Girl Move) which is more than half the costs for personnel.  
It is also important to highlight the payment seasonality of certain categories, such as “Safe 
spaces”, which the total costs are incurred at the beginning of the project. This lead refers to 
the materials and maintenance of each safe space, which need to be 100% operational before 
each intervention.  The same happens with “Equipment”, referring to mobile phones for 
mentors in order to gather data.  
Additionally, to the costs of the intervention is necessary to add expenses related to the 
development of the DIB. The contract with an Intermediary, Outcome Evaluator and other 
potential contract costs will incur extra 25.000€ per year. 
Regarding the yearly costs, ie, direct costs plus indirect costs, for the first year these will 
amount to 248.621€, for the second and third year 267.103€ and for the fourth year 18.481€, 
this last value represents the costs for the month of January of 2021, which is the last month 
of the last intervention; the same logic is applied to the costs of the 1st year: because the first 
intervention only starts in February, there are still no costs for January 2018.  
In a cost per intervention perspective, the costs are the same, amounting to 267.103€, which 
includes 900 girls. The cost per intervention of supporting one girl is equal to 297€, then the 
product 2700 girls (for the three interventions) with 297€ per girl will provide the total 
investment required. Therefore the total investment for the DIB will sum up to 801.309,96€.  
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Table 2 DIB Costs per year 
 
5.3. Key performance indicators 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the establishment of KPIs is crucial to be able to evaluate 
if the intervention is being successful and that these can be set in four steps: 
5.3.1. Goals  
The DIB aims to fight low school attainment for girls in Mozambique which, according the 
macro-research in section 4.1, showed a need for improvements on primary and secondary 
levels. In addition, the same chapter highlights the effects of additional years of education to 
girls in developing countries, Therefore the KPIs for this DIB will be the following: 
 
 KPI 1: Conclusion of primary school 
This indicator aims to measure the number of girls that successfully finish primary school, 
which implies having minimum grades to conclude the academic year plus passing the 
national exam. The data for the assessment will be the public official data. 
 
 KPI 2: Transition to secondary school 
This indicator intends to assess the number of girls that get registered in secondary school 
after concluding primary school. Such implies overcome girls’ financial and cultural-social 
barriers, being these major causes for low school attainment, as seen on the problem tree. 
Because the intervention has only one year duration it will not be possible to assess the 
performance of girls in the secondary level.  
 
Costs of DIB
(€) 2018 2019 2020 2021
Direct Costs 187.065,63     202.223,96   202.223,96   15.158,33     
Personnel 133.866,92     146.036,64   146.036,64   12.169,72     
Safe Spaces 3.220,00         3.220,00       3.220,00       -                
Transportation 6.475,00         6.600,00       6.600,00       125,00          
Content production 3.420,63         3.503,96       3.503,96       83,33            
Training 7.970,00         8.240,00       8.240,00       270,00          
Incentives 27.613,08       30.123,36     30.123,36     2.510,28       
Equipement 4.500,00         4.500,00       4.500,00       -                
Indirect Costs 61.556,08       64.879,36     64.879,36     3.323,28       
Utilities and Services 36.556,08       39.879,36     39.879,36     3.323,28       
Perfomance manager contracting 10.000,00       10.000,00     10.000,00     -                
Outcome evaluator 10.000,00       10.000,00     10.000,00     -                
Contract costs 5.000,00         5.000,00       5.000,00       -                
Cost/mwarusi/ month 23,02              24,73            24,73            1,71              
#mwarusis 900,00            900,00          900,00          900,00          
Total costs/  month 20.718,48       22.258,61     22.258,61     1.540,13       
Total costs/ year 248.621,71     267.103,32   267.103,32   18.481,61     
Total costs 801.309,96     
Source: Girl Move Yearly Report (2016)
Exchange rate: 60MET
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The indicators were established considering a cycle of primary and secondary school, making 
them continual indicators and therefore the second depends on the first. This will have 
implications on the measurement of economic gains for KPI 2.  
 
5.3.2. Impact baseline 
The impact baseline will be established for both KPIs, Academic Approval and Transition to 
secondary, based on the reference values for the country of Mozambique.  
 
5.3.3. Unitary economic gains 
 KPI 1: Conclusion of primary school 
As explained in the section 4.2.2., the assessment of the economic gains will be based on the 
average wage (a proxy for productivity) of girls who finish primary level compared to the 
ones who don’t. The goal is to obtain the lifetime costs of girls abandoning primary school 
(independently of the level in primary school). The measurement of the economic gains for 
this KPI was already calculated in this same chapter, obtaining a value of 7019€. 
 
 KPI 2: Transition to secondary school 
The main difference on this indicator is that it does not represent the total life-time earnings 
differential for a girl concluding secondary school, but rather the gains that are originated 
merely from a girl getting registered in secondary. Therefore, the calculation will require a 
further step: after assessing the individual’s life-time earnings differential for concluding 
secondary level, 6246€7, this value must be adjusted to represent only the economic gains 
from a girl getting registered in secondary, by multiplying this value for the probability of a 
girl who enrolls in secondary level to actually conclude it. According to the World Bank, only 
21.8%8 of girls enrolling in secondary school ends up concluding the lower secondary level. 
Therefore, the economic gains previously obtained must be multiplied by 21.8%, taking into 
account that from all the girls registering only these 21.8% will be successful. Therefore, the 
economic value representing a girl that registers into secondary school is 1312€. 
 
                                                 
7 Applied same methodology as in KPI 1 
8 Due lack of data the value used is for lower secondary and not for the entire secondary.  
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The establishment of KPIs and respective economic gains is the base to calculate the impact 
payment per successful intervention, ie, for each girl that was impacted by the DIB. This will 
be explored in the following section. 
 
5.4. Payment Structure 
To reach the total impact payment to be paid back to investors, this DIB will follow the 
following features: 
 Continuous Payment Methodology  
For the Girls’ education DIB it was decided that payments should not be dependent on pre-
established target results, which follows a logic of payments for intervals of outcomes, 
implying that, for example, impacting 100 girls could generate the same payment as 120 girls. 
In this DIB, the impact payment will be disbursed according to each unit of impact achieved, 
generating different disbursement values for investors if 100 or 120 girls are impacted.  Again, 
the word “impacted” is key in this computation. As it was mentioned before, an impacted girl 
refers to a girl that would not have changed her status-quo situation if it were not for the DIB.   
 Payment cap 
The Total Impact Payment is capped at 801.310€, corresponding to the total costs of the 
program. 
 Incentive to service provider 
If the combination of results from indicators are high to the point of originating a total impact 
payment superior to intervention costs, investors do not receive any surplus, however the 
service provider may be rewarded for such achievement, receiving a proportion of the 
additional amount. The proportion will be the same as IRAC, so if IRAC equals to 8, they will 
receive a proportion of 8% over the difference of total impact payments and total initiative 
costs. 
 Foreign Exchange provision 
The capital allocation from the investor to the service provider will be made in euros. 
The capital allocation from impact payers back to the investor will also be made in euros.  
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5.4.1. Potential Impact 
In order to assess the variation of Impact Payments according to results, there were developed 
three scenarios of impact results: Low Impact Scenario, Moderate Impact and High Impact. 
For simplicity reasons this chapter will only analyze the Moderate Impact scenario, however 
the reasoning applied in this analysis is the same for the other scenarios.  
 
 
Table 3 Moderate Impact Scenario 
 
The table shows the impact baseline for both KPIs, as defined in section 2.2.1.3. For the 
indicator of Academic Approval, in Mozambique 45% of the girls conclude primary school. 
As for secondary school, the value is quite lower, with only 27% of girls transiting to 
secondary school. These rates applied to the sample of one intervention, 900 Mwarusis, given 
the number of girls within the sample that would be expected to succeed without the 
development of the DIB. Therefore, only the results above the 405 girls will be considered in 
the total payment.  
The row of outcomes provides the total results that the intervention achieved. If in the first 
intervention the outcomes would be 60%, then 540 girls would go to school.  This value of 
outcomes, subtracted to the impact baseline, results in the impact created. In other words, 
because of the DIB, in a first intervention, 135 girls would be impacted. This is the number 
that will be held accountable to compute the IP.  
After assessing the value of the three interventions, it can be concluded that a total of 1755 
out of 2700 girls successfully finished primary school and 1161 out of 2700 transitioned to 
secondary school. For KPI1, the average of all impacts was 20% meaning that 540 additional 
changed status versus what would be expected without intervention. Regarding KPI2, the 





Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 60% 540 40% 360
Impact 15% 135 13% 117
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 65% 585 43% 387
Impact 20% 180 16% 144
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 70% 630 46% 414
Impact 25% 225 19% 171
Total Impact 20% 540 16% 432






Impact Results (%  and #)
Academic Approval Transition to Secondary
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 Another valuable insight is to understand which percentage of impact was originated out of 
the potential impact for the whole intervention. Considering the status quo of 45%, the 
potential impact will be 55% or, in absolute values, 1485 out of 2700 girls. If the intervention 
impacts 540 girls (sum of impact of three interventions), then the ratio between 540 and 1485 
would provide how much impact was achieved out the possible impact. In this case, 36% of 
the potential impact was reached for KPI1 and 22% for KPI2.  
The average of both values will define if an intervention is “Low, Moderate or High” on 
impact. For a low impact intervention, we propose the ratio is below 25%; Moderate impact 
goes from 25% to 49% and High impact from 50% onwards.  
In this case, the average of 36% and 22% is 29%, a Moderate Impact intervention as mentioned 
in the beginning of this chapter.  
 
In order to proceed to the calculation of Total Impact Payment, the impact originated from 
each intervention must be taken into consideration, ie, for KPI1 540 girls and KPI2 432 girls. 
5.4.2. Unitary Impact Payments’ formula 
The TIP formula was introduced in section 2.2.2., computing the total capital to be disbursed 
to investor(s). Via the same equation it is possible to obtain the UIP per KPI, which is the 
value, depending on the KPI, that must be paid for each girl that is impacted. 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 × (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
 
After defining the indicators and its economic values, in section 6.3, it is possible to replace 
the variables in the equation, obtaining an equation for each KPI: 
 
Payment Rate, is the average of the relative TI of both indicators. Therefore, 20% and 16%, 
equaling 18%.  
 
Unitary Economic Gain is the value, in euros, added to the economy by impacting one girl. 
This definition is in section 2.2.1.4.  
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐶 = 7019€ : For each extra girl finishing primary 
school, the economy will have a gain of 7019€. 
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 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑇 = 1312 € : For each extra girl transiting to 
secondary school, the economy will have a gain of 1312€. 
 
KPI 1 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶 = 18%[(7019 )= 1263.42€ 
 
KPI 2 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑇 = 18%(1312 )=236.16€ 
 
Unitary Impact Payment per𝐾𝑃𝐼  is the value, in euros, that outcome payers must disburse 
per unit of impact, ie, impacted girl.  
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶 = 𝟏𝟐𝟔𝟑. 𝟒𝟐€: For each extra girl finishing 
primary school, outcome payers will pay 1263.42€. 
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇 = 𝟐𝟑𝟔. 𝟏𝟔€: For each extra girl transiting to 
secondary school, outcome payers will pay 236.16€. 
 
 
5.4.3. Impact Payment Scenarios 
To estimate a potential TIP to investors, it will be used the previous example scenario of 
“Moderate Impact”. 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×  𝛴(𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
= 18% × [(7019𝐾𝑃𝐼1 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼1) + (1312𝐾𝑃𝐼2 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼2)] 
= (1263.42𝐾𝑃𝐼1 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼1) + (236.16𝐾𝑃𝐼2 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼2) 
= (1263.42𝐾𝑃𝐼1 × 540𝐾𝑃𝐼1) + (236.16𝐾𝑃𝐼2 × 432𝐾𝑃𝐼2) 
= 𝟕𝟖𝟒. 𝟐𝟔𝟕€   
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Table 4 Impact Payments- Moderate Impact Scenario 
 
Because 540 additional girls finished primary school, the country of Mozambique benefited 
from EGs in the order of €3.790.260, in terms of life-time earnings. Furthermore, 432 of these 
girls proceeded to the next level of studies and got registered in secondary school, adding extra 
value to the country, this time in the order of €566.360. In total, the existence of the DIB 
created to the economy a TEG of €4.357.044, in terms of life-time earnings. 
After applying the payment rate to each EG, it is obtained the IP of each indicator. Under this 
scenario, it is concluded that impact payers must disburse a total of €784.267 back to investors.   
 
Table 5 Moderate Impact Scenario 
The total amount disbursed in this scenario will cover 98% of intervention costs, and as an 
IRAC of 5,56, indicating that for one euro disbursed (by outcome payers) it created in return 
5,56€ of impact. Considering that the total impact payment did not exceed the total 
intervention costs, there is no incentive for the service provider.  
 
In appendix 7 and 8 can be found the other two scenarios for low and high impact. 
  
Impact Payments: Moderate Impact
€ KPI1: Academic Approval KPI2: Transition to secondary
Impact Baseline 45% 27%
Outcomes 65% 43%
Impact 20% 16%
Economic Gain 3.790.260€                                566.784€                                             
Total Economic Gain 4.357.044€                             -€                                                   
Payment Rate 18%
Impact Payment  €                             682.246,80 102.021,12€                                        
Total Impact Payment 784.267,92€                           
Intervention Costs Covered 98%
IRAC 5,56
Incentive Service provider -€                  
Results
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5.5. Capital’s flows and timings 
In the last sections, it was assessed the total value of the project, or in other words, of the three 
interventions together, enabling to understand the reasoning behind the computation of the 
total impact value. However, as previously mentioned, the flows capital will not be disbursed 
at a single moment in time.  
 
The payments to Girl Move will be made one month before starting the intervention, every 
January, independently of the results attained. Such decision can be interpreted as risky, 
however the impact historic of this foundation has granted this right. In addition, the payment 
must be made every January in order to fund the same intervention.  
 
Table 6 Impact Payments and timings 
Regarding the flows of capital from impact payers to investors, these will depend on the 
impact generated after each intervention. Therefore, there will be a period when the outcome 
evaluator will assess which level of impact was reached for both indicators. However, for the 
indicator of Academic Approval, the evaluation period will be in December, corresponding to 
the timing when schools release the grades from the academic year; as for  Transitioning to 
secondary the assessment will be done only in March, 3 months later, since girls will have to 
make the national exam and wait for the results, which are released in the month of March. 
After all results are released from the respective national bodies, the outcome evaluator will 
make its unbiased valuation, which is expected to be released in May, an average of 2 months 
duration. Only then the IP can be made accordingly to the impact created. Despite the different 
timings of indicators, there will be only one payment per intervention, taking into account the 
results of both interventions.  
The following graphic shows the flows of capital from the investor(s) to Girl Move (in blue) 
and later on, according the scenario developed, the repayment from impact payers to investors.  
 
 






Intervention 1 Academic Approval 135 170.562€                dez-18 mai-19
Transition to secundary 117 27.631€                  mar-19 mai-19
Intervention 2 Academic Approval 180 227.416€                dez-19 mai-20
Transition to secundary 144 34.007€                  mar-20 mai-20
Intervention 3 Academic Approval 225 284.270€                dez-20 mai-21
Transition to secundary 171 40.383€                  mar-21 mai-21
Mafalda Henriques Simões 54 
 
Figure 19 Cashflows Impact Payments 
 
Therefore, under this DIB there will be 3 flows of capital from investor(s) to Girl Move, 
referring to intervention payments, and three flows of impact payments from impact payers to 
investors.  
The first intervention payment is made in January 2018, amounting to 267.103€, as the two 
remaining intervention payments. If these three values are summed up, the result will be the 
Total Costs, 801.309€.  
The impact payments, under this scenario, will be disbursed starting in April 19, implying that 
investors will receive their first payment one year and four months after their first allocation 
of capital. This flow of capital will amount to €198.193, which according to the table 7, is the 
payment of impacting 135 girls to finish primary school and, from these 135 girls, 117 going 
to secondary school.  The two remaining impact payments will be paid back to investors in 




jan-18 jun-18 nov-18 abr-19 set-19 fev-20 jul-20 dez-20 mai-21
Capital's flows
Intervention Payments Impact Payments
- €267.103,32 - €267.103,32
€  198.193,00 
€  261.423,00 
€  324.653,00 
- €267.103,32
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6. Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed to fulfill two different goals: At a first stage, the low activity within 
the Development Impact Bond market raised a red flag on why such a small number of DIB’s 
was in the market, while SIBs experienced a different reality. The first aim was thus to explain 
the difficulties in adopting the DIB instrument and to propose a re-designed model of DIB. 
The second task, which ended up complementing the first, aimed to develop a DIB for a 
specific country and NGO. 
The analysis was from the very beginning oriented to the fact that in a DIB governments are 
not the outcome payers, and that such structural change can deeply influence the principles of 
this mechanism.  
To counter interact the potential issues originated by not having a governmental entity, two 
adjustments are suggested in this thesis (Chapter 2):  
i. The impact originated from a DIB can no longer be measured in terms of financial 
gains (savings) for the government. A potential new measure for impact could be the 
gains that were brought for the economy due the DIB.  
ii. Outcome payers will have to finance the principal plus return, which might raise 
difficulties on finding donor agencies willing to pay the return component. The 
solution is finding entities for the investor role who are willing to abdicate returns and 
therefore perceive a DIB as way to expedite their budget and therefore leverage other 
investment opportunities. 
As a result, in Chapter 5, the new DIB model is applied to a specific case: Girl Move, an NGO 
that operates in Mozambique to fight low school attainment for girls. 
The total value of DIB is 801.309€, it targets 2700 girls and in a “moderate impact scenario” 
it is forecasted to impact 540 girls. This means that, without the DIB, 540 girls would have 
not been able to finish primary school and 432 would not have registered for secondary school. 
Because one of the principles of this model is to measure the impact of the DIB in terms of 
economic gains, these girls translate a total of €4.357.044 of macroeconomic gains for the 
Mozambican country which in a status quo (without the DIB) would not have existed. In 
contrast to the considerable value added, this model proposes an impact payment of €783.267, 
with an IRAC of 5,56. The interpretation of this value is the following: for every euro paid by 
impact payers, 5,56€ worth of economic gains were originated for Mozambique.   
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7. Appendixes  
APPENDIX 1: TYPES OF PBRS MODELS 
 
 
Results based aid (RBA) 
As the name indicates, the funding is made in the form of aid implicating that capital is provided by a donor. The 
social provider, that can be a national or sub-national government body of the partner country (Pearson 2011; 
Pearson / Johnson / Ellison 2010; Klingebiel 2012), will fund its’ own activities. The donor disburses the funds 
once the service provider has achieved the results that have been defined in a contract beforehand and after the 
achievement of results has been verified by the outcome evaluator.  
 
Results based finance (RBF) 
The World Bank defines RBF as “any program that rewards the delivery of one or more outputs or outcomes by 
one or more incentives, financial or otherwise,” after the outcome payer has verified that the service provider 
has delivered the agreed-upon results (Musgrove 2010). The outcome payer is a national or sub-national 
government body. The service provider, that again funds its activities, can be a private non-profit organization, 
a private for-profit provider or a sub-national government level in the case of a performance-based financing 
approach (Pearson 2011). RBF may be funded by domestic funds, by donor funds or by a combination of both 
(Klingebiel 2012).  
 
Hybrid results based aid/financing (HRB) 
Financing hybrids combine aspects of both RBF and RBA and use aid funds to contract 
local or international NGOs or private sector providers directly. 
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APPENDIX 2: TYPES OF STRUCTURE 
 
 Direct Contracting between impact payers and service providers 
Does not include the presence of an intermediary, meaning that the negotiations and capital flows are made 
directly between investor, service provider and outcome payer.  
 
 
 Indirect Contracting- via an intermediary 
When there is an intermediary involved its’ role is to manage the negotiations and capital flows. In this case, the 
intermediary will hold the capital provenient from investors and then allocate it to the service provider. If in the 
end of the intervention capital disbursed, the intermediary will receive it from outcome payers and only them 
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APPENDIX 3: IMPACT PAYMENT AND UNITARY IMPACT PAYMENT 
To obtain how much must be paid per indicator it is computed the Impact Payments. 
 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 × (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
 
Via the same equation it is possible to obtain the Unitary Impact Payment per KPI, simply by excluding the 
variable 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛. Such value adds extra value for continuous models, where no target results are 
established and the only option to compute a value for potential impact payment is to speculate a variety of 
scenarios for impact results.  
 
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×  (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
 
When applying these formulas to a practical example: 
If  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×  (Unitary𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑛) 
= 20%(3000 × 150 )=9000€ 
 
The KPI1 would create economic gains to society estimated in €450.000 (Unitary Economic Gain times the 
number of impacted individuals) and lead to an impact payment of €90.000.  
As for the unitary impact payment of KPI1 it equals €600, ie, per every unit of impact associated to KPI1 the 
payment is €600. If we multiply this value for the value of impact, 150, it will result in the same €90.000. 
 
After applying these same computations to KPI 2, the sum of Impact Payments of both KPIs would result in the 
Total Impact Payment.  
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APPENDIX 4 : SCHOOL ATTAINMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE  
 
The Mozambican government has put education as a first priority. On a sectorial perspective, education was 
found to be the largest piece on the state budget (19%) when compared with the other priority sectors, followed 
by the infrastructure sector. An analysis from 2004 until 2013 shows a steady trend of expenditure on education 
as a percentage of total government expenditure, with 18% and 19% for each respective year. The year of 2005 
contrasts with the others where spending reached 22.7%. (UNICEF, 2015) This considerable upward variation 
coincides with the, at the date, new policy of abolition of school fees and provision of direct support to schools 
and free textbooks. (The World Bank, 2009) As for the expenditure on education on the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA, all income levels), it has been recorded an average spending of 16.5%. 
But how much of education spending is originated from internal resources, such as taxes, tariffs, duties, and 
credit and external resources, like external aid?  
Worldwide, between 2010 and 2013, the total aid provided showed an increase in social sectors such as health, 
which experienced an accelerated growth. The opposite happened to education, considering that aid allocated to 
education fell by 9 percent (Steer & Smith, 2015). Mozambique has presented opposite trends to the ones just 
presented, showing steady increase of external funding to the education sector. For the year of 2013, €65.72M 
of euros and €84.68M for 2015 (UNICEF, 2015).  
Mozambique’s distribution of expenditure between levels of education was found to be quite imbalanced, with 
primary schooling absorbing 49% of the total funds spent on education, while secondary 30.6% (World 
Bank,2015). As such, several changes have been observed on education variables as enrollment and completion 
rates, and especially on gender equality. 
 
Net enrolment rate of primary9 education confirms a substantial increase from 2004 to 2009, both for girls and 
boys. For female students, it rose from 64% in 2004 to 83%, while for males 71% to 88%. However, from 2009 
forward the enrollment rate growth decreases for both genders. Therefore, in 2009 the gender inequality for 
primary enrollment was 5 p.p, favoring boys. For 2014, this indicator was relatively the same. (World Bank: 
Education Statistics, 2017) 
 
 
                                                 
9 Divide the total number of female/male students enrolled who are of the official age group for primary education by the female/male 
population for the same age group and multiply the result by 100. 
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Net Enrolment- Female and Male (%) 
 
 
On the secondary school level, the gross intake ratio10 (2013) for boys and girls is again distinctive: the 
percentage of new male entrants on this school level (31%) is again superior to girls, but only for 1,8 p.p of 
difference. 11  
 
Gross Intake Ratio to Lower Secondary- Female, Male, GPI 
 
The existing data allows to realize how low school attainment either for boys and girls is, and evaluate the 
existing gender gaps. All of the education variables (Net enrolment rate of primary education, the rate of students 
                                                 
10 Total number of new female entrants in the first grade of lower secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
population at the official lower secondary school-entrance age.  
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enrolled in the last year of primary school and intake on secondary level) presented lower values for females 
than boys.  
 
Subsequently to the macro analysis, it’s going to be applied the Impact framework to break down the social issue 
into causes and effects.  
 
APPENDIX 5: SAFE SPACES CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. Leadership and empowerment of women and girls A safe space should be women and girl-led and 
offer an inclusive and empowering environment for them. Women and girls should be included in 
project planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the space to ensure relevance and 
ownership11. There should be regular exchanges with them about how the space is to be run and 
managed. Women and girls should decide the opening hours, as well as the types of activities to be 
undertaken. They should feel a sense of ownership with the space, rather than considering it a center 
being run for them by an external source 
 
2. Client/survivor centered The design of the safe space, the activities and services it offers, and the 
discussions it organizes should prioritize the safety and confidentiality of women and girls accessing 
the center. Any case files, documentation of services, and client data kept at the center should be 
properly secured. The center should be open to all women and girls, and their wishes, choices, rights, 
and dignity should be respected. They should be provided with information about available services 
and options. The staff should be extensively trained on the principle of non-discrimination12 
 
3. Safe and accessible  
The safe space should be located in an area that is conveniently accessible to women and girls, and 
assures safety and privacy. The decision on where to locate the safe space should be led by women and 
girls. If that is not feasible, they should at minimum be consulted. Accessibility should also consider 
timings and days that work best for them. If possible, consideration must be made to support the 
transportation costs to and from the space. The WGSS should ensure that a Code of Conduct is adopted 
and all staff is trained on it.  
 
4. Community involvement While the safe space should be a space meant for and run by women and 
girls, its sustainability will require the input and support of many stakeholders. Husbands, parents, and 
community leaders have a lot of influence over the ability of women and girls to participate in 
programmes. It is, therefore, essential to understand the perspectives of these individuals while setting 
up a safe space, and to mobilize community support for the WGSS so that women and girls are able to 
safely participate in all activities. Ultimately, women and girls spaces should not be isolated units, but 
an extension of broader community life. Men and boys have an important role in ensuring the success 
of safe spaces. Engaging them to ensure they understand the purpose, location and benefits of the safe 
spaces will enable the participation of a larger number of women and girls. Ensuring the involvement 
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of and buy-in from the community for sustainability of the initiative, is vital to the success of the safe 
space.  
 
5. Coordinated and multi-sectorial The safe space should take into consideration, the varying needs 
and experiences of women and girls. It should deliver services that respond to their life cycle, 
including issues related to GBV prevention and response13. The range of possible activities is rather 
vast and should be decided with the involvement of women and girls, and according to the specific 
situation. In some cases, a center may host a range of services from sexual and reproductive health, to 
psychosocial support, to legal services; at other times, some of these services will be available 
elsewhere. A clear internal and external referral system, should be in place and staff and volunteers 
should be able to activate it safely and confidentially, It would be useful to be part of the wider GBV 
coordination network and standard operating procedure process for an effective referral mechanism.  
 
6. Tailored A safe space should be inviting enough for women and girls to feel welcomed and engaged. 
It is important to maintain balance between structured activities, services, and times to socialize. 
Activities and approaches need to be culturally and age appropriate as the needs and interests of a 16 
year-old girl are bound to be different from those of a 35 year-old woman. A safe space should also 
take into consideration, the special needs of women and girls living with disabilities.  
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% # % #
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 50% 450 30% 270
Impact 5% 45 3% 27
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 55% 495 33% 297
Impact 10% 90 6% 54
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 60% 540 36% 324
Impact 15% 135 9% 81
Total Impact 10% 270 6% 162





Impact Results (%  and #) Academic Approval Transition to Secondary
Intervention 1
Impact Payments Intervention 1 (€)
KPI1: Academic Approval KPI2: Transition to secondary
Impact Baseline 45% 27%
Outcomes 55% 33%
Impact 10% 6%
Economic Gain 1.895.130,00€                           212.544,00€                                        
Total Economic Gain 2.107.674,00€                       
Payment Rate 13%
Impact Payment  €                             246.366,90 27.630,72€                                          
Total Impact Payment 273.997,62€                           
IRAC 7,69
Intervention Costs Covered 34%
IRAC 7,69
Incentive Service provider -€                  
Results
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APPENDIX 8: IMPACT PAYMENTS: HIGH IMPACT 
 
The results for High Impact scenario illustrate a case where the Total Impact Payment is 
2.809.016, due a 33% payment rate. However, this DIB has as definition a cap equal to the 
intervention costs, allowing impact investors to only disburse €801.309. Nonetheless, because 
the originated impact was high enough to generate a Total Impact Payment superior to the 
intervention costs. Service providers would receive the differential of €2.501.571,6k and 
€801.309, times the IRAC, in percentual terms, 3.03%, resulting in a small amount of 51.517€. 











% # % #
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 80% 720 50% 450
Impact 35% 315 23% 207
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 85% 765 55% 495
Impact 40% 360 28% 252
Impact Baseline 45% 405 27% 243
Outcomes 90% 810 55% 495
Impact 45% 405 28% 252
Total Impact 40,00% 1080 26,33% 711




Impact Results (%  and #)
Academic Approval Transition to Secondary
Intervention 1
Intervention 2
Impact Payments Intervention 1 (€)
KPI1: Academic Approval KPI2: Transition to secondary
Impact Baseline 45% 27%
Outcomes 85,0% 53,3%
Impact 40,00% 26,30%
Economic Gain 7.580.520€                                931.651€                                             
Total Economic Gain 8.512.171€                             -€                                                   
Payment Rate 33%
Impact Payment  €                          2.501.571,60 307.444,83€                                        
Total Impact Payment 2.809.016,43€                       
IRAC 3,03
IRAC ' 10,62
Intervention Costs Covered 351%
IRAC 3,03
Incentive Service provider 51.517,93€       
Results
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